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ALSO THIS TERM
01-188 Pharmaceutical Research v. Concannon
Ruling Below: (Pharmaceutical Research v. Concannon, 1 Cir., 249 F.3d 66, 2001 U.S.
App. Lexis 9324)
The court held that the state prescription drug-pricing program was not an unconstitutional
violation of the commerce clause.
Questions Presented: (1) Does a state pricing program for prescription drugs conflict with
the federal Medicaid statute?
(2) May a state require an out-of-state manufacturer who sells to an out-of-state wholesaler
to pay the state each time a retailer in the state sells one of the manufacturer's products?
01-270 Yellow Transportation, Inc. v. Michigan
Ruling Below: (Yellow Freight Sys. v. Michigan, MI Sup.Ct., 464 Mich. 21, 627 N.W.2d
236, 2001 Mich. Lexis 883)
The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) froze the amount of money
states could charge trucking companies at the fee the state collected or charged as of Nov.
15, 1991. It also established the Single State Registration System, by which each company
only had to register its vehicles with one state and that state would collect fees and distribute
them to states through which the company's vehicles passed. The court held that any
reciprocal agreements that the state had which might have reduced the economic impact of
the generic fee were irrelevant. The plain meaning of the ISTEA was applicable.
Question Presented: Whether the Michigan Supreme Court erred in holding that only a
State's "generic" fee is relevant to determining the fee that was "collected or charged as of
November 15, 1991" under Congress's Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
(ISTEA)?
01-593 Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson
01-594 Dead Sea Co. v. Patrickson
Ruling Below: (Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 9th Cir., 251 F.3d 795, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis
11207, 2001 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4353; 2001 DailyJournal DAR 5357)
The court held that it did not have jurisdiction over the issue as framed by the plaintiffs.
Question Presented: Whether federal courts have jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act over a class action by foreign workers, who have allegedly been exposed to
toxic pesticides, against multinational companies?
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01-704 United States v. Bean
Ruling Below: (Bean v. BATF, 5 Cir., 253 F.3d 234, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 13804)
The court held that because the plaintiff's administrative options had been exhausted,
regardless of the reasons, the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in granting relief to the plaintiff.
Question Presented: Whether a federal district court (which normally handles appeals
from the ATF) has authority to exempt a convicted felon from the prohibition against
possessing firearms in light of annual appropriations limitations from Congress that keep the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) from having funds to process applications
for such exemptions?
01-705 Barnhart, Social Security Admin. Commissioner v. Peabody Coal Co.
01-715 Holland v. Bellaire Corp.
Ruling Below: (Bellaire Corp. v. Mfassanari, 6th Cir., 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 14784, 14 Fed.
Appx. 424)
(Peabody Coal Co. v. Massanari, 6th Cir., 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 14471, 14 Fed. Appx. 393)
The court granted summary judgment for the coal companies in both cases because the
commissioner lacked the authority to make assignments after October 1, 1993.
Question Presented: Whether the failure of the Commissioner of Social Security to assign
responsibility as of October 1, 1993, as required by legislation, for each eligible retired coal
miner to the signatory operator that employed the miner (or to a "related person" of the
signatory operator) voids the benefits?
01-757 Syngenta Crop Protection Inc. v. Henson
Ruling Below: (Henson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 11 Cir., 261 F.3d 1065, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18344, 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1094)
The court held that the action before that state lacked any issue of original jurisdiction for a
federal court, and that the federal district court did not gain removal jurisdiction simply
because the state action was inconsistent with a federal settlement.
Question Presented: Whether the federal district court had removal jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1441 and the All Writs Act over a later action solely because prosecuting that action
violated a settlement stipulation in an earlier action already before the court?
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01-800 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
Ruling Below: (Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Howsam, 1 0 ,h Cir., 261 F.3d 956, 2001 U.S.
App. Lexis 17971, 2001 Colo. J. C.A.R 4033)
The court held that the arbitrability of issues in a service agreement is to be decided the
courts, not the arbitrators of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). The
court should decide whether an issue is time-barred under the NASD rules unless there is
clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended otherwise.
Question Presented: Whether the court has the jurisdiction to decide issues of arbitrability
as set forth under the NASD rules of arbitration?
01-896 Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley
Ruling Below: (McCauleyv. Ford Motor Co., 9 ,h Cir., 264 F.3d 952, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis
19700, 2001 Cal. Daily Op. Service 7862, 2001 Daily Journal DAR 9731)
Credit cardholders claimed the issuers wrongly terminated the ability to accrue rebates
towards purchasing vehicles. The court found no jurisdiction because the claims of the class
could not be aggregated nor could the cost of reinstating the program for all cardholders
could not be used to establish the amount in controversy.
Question Presented: May the cost to a defendant of complying with an injunction sought
by a plaintiffs' class satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement of the federal diversity
statute, when such compliance would cost the defendant more than the $75,000 minimum
whether it covered the entire class or any single member of class?
01-1015 Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc.
Ruling Below: (V. Secret Catalogue v. Moseley, 6 h Cir., 259 F.3d 464, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis
16937, 2001 Fed App. 0247P (6th Cir.), 59 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1650)
Defendant marketed adult products under the name Victor's Little Secret. Plaintiff's
Victoria's Secret catalogue marketed women's lingerie and clothing. The court held the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act requires only an inference of likely harm, not a showing of
actual harm. Similarities between the marks in this case supported a finding of dilution.
Question Presented: Does the plain meaning of the operative phrase "causes dilution of
the distinctive quality of the mark," read in conjunction with the definition of dilution as
"the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods and
services," require objective proof of actual injury to economic value of the famous mark (as
opposed to a presumption of harm arising from subjective "likelihood of dilution" standard)
as a precondition to any and all relief under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act?
682
01-1209 Boeing Co. v. United States
01-1382 United States v. Boeing Sales Corp.
Ruling Below: (Boeing Co. v. U.S., 9 " Cir., 258 F.3d 958; 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 17168;
2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P50,562; 88 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5317; 2001 Cal. Daily Op.
Service 6537; 2001 DailyJournal DAR 8046)
The court held that the Treasury Regulation was permissible under the Internal Revenue
Code, and that Boeing's allocation of costs was in violation of the regulation.
Questions Presented: (1) Whether the Treas. Reg. 5 1.861-8(e)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code, which governs the allocation of research & development costs between foreign and
domestic income, may be applied to the computation of taxable income for export
subsidiaries entitled to special tax treatment under the Code?
(2) If certiorari is granted and judgment is reversed in Case No. 01- 1209, should the
judgment of the appeals court in favor of the cross-respondent then also be reversed?
01-1269 Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope
Ruling Below: (Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found. v. Cuyahoga Falls, 6t Cir., 263 F.3d 627, 2001
U.S. App. Lexis 19391, 2001 Fed App. 0299P (6th Cir.))
The court denied summary judgment for the municipality because it found there was
sufficient evidence to raise factual issues about racial bias in the municipality's actions.
Questions Presented: (1) In considering a claim against a municipal corporation for
intentional discrimination arising out of a facially neutral and judicially upheld referendum
petition, whether the court may inquire into the motivations of a handful of the citizens who
expressed support for the referendum and impute those motivations to the entire municipal
corporation?
(2) Whether a disparate impact claim under the Fair Housing Act be maintained against a
municipal corporation for the alleged impact of the filing of a facially neutral and judicially
upheld referendum petition?
(3) Whether the due process clause requires a muncipal corporation to issue building permits
when the underlying conditions for the issuance of building permits have not been met and
the municipal corporation's witholding of the permits is required by the judgments of state
courts of competent jurisdiction?
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01-1418 Archerv. Warner
Ruling Below: (Archer v. Warner, 4 h Cir., 283 F.3d 230, 2002 U.S. App. Lexis 3678, Bankr.
L. Rep. (C-) P78,609, 39 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 50)
The creditors filed suit against the debtors and a settlement was reached with no mention of
bankruptcy. The debtors defaulted on the promissory note from the settlement, and
declared bankruptcy. The creditors sought determination that the debt was
non-dischargeable based on the same alleged wrong-doings that led to the settlement of the
first suit. The court held that the settlement created a dischargeable contract debt in place of
a fraud-based tort claim.
Question Presented: Whether a promissory note given in settlement of pending litigation
can constitue a nondischareable debt "for money, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of
credit, obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud," within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Code., where the parties execute a settlement agreement and
general release of all claims of fraud or misrepresentation underlying the litigation and all
future claims arising from the same facts, where the debtor has neither admitted nor been
found to have engaged in fraud or misrepresentation underlying the litigation, and where the
creditor has failed to allege fraud in connection with the procurement of the settlement?
01- 1491 Demore v. Kim
Ruling Below: (Kim v. Ziglar, 9th Cir., 276 F.3d 523, 2002 U.S. App. Lexis 277, 2002 Cal.
Daily Op. Service 192, 2002 DailyJournal DAR 275)
The court held that the unavailability of bail for lawful permanent resident aliens was
unconstitutional. The court did not declare this section of the Immigration and Nationality
Act unconstitutional on its face.
Question Presented: Whether respondent's mandatory detention without bail under
Immigration and Nationality Act, which requires the Attorney General to take into custody
aliens who are inadmissible to or deportable from the United States because they have
comnitted a specified offense, including an aggravated felony, violates the 5th Amendment's
Due Process Clause, where the respondent was convicted of an aggravated felony after his
admission into the United States?
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01-1500 Clay v. United States
Ruling Below: (Gayv. U.S., 7 h Cir., 2002 U.S. App. Lexis 1217, 30 Fed. Appx. 607;
petitioning for relief from U.S. v. Clay, 7 h Cir., 1998 U.S. App. Lexis 30134)
The court held that the prisoner's petition for review by the Supreme Court was time-barred
by 28 U.S.C.S § 2255.
Question Presented: Whether the period of limitations for petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court begins to run on the date the appellate court issued its mandate in a direct
criminal appea
01-1572 Cook County v. United States
Ruling Below: (U.S. v. Cook County, 7t' Cr., 277 F.3d 969, 2002 U.S. App. Lexis 847, 18
BNA IER CAS 512)
The court held that the county was a person within the meaning of the False Claims Act, and
thus not immune from punitive damages.
Question Presented: Whether local governmental entities are immune from punitive
damages under the False Claims Act?
01-7574 Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania
Ruling Below: (Pennsylvania v. Sattazahn, PA Sup.Ct., 563 Pa. 533, 763 A.2d 359, 2000 Pa.
Lexis 2815)
The court held that the conviction and sentence was constitutional because the first jury had
not made a decision on the merits regarding an appropriate penalty, so the statutorily
imposed life sentence was not an acquittal.
Question Presented: (1) Does the double jeopardy clause of the 5th Amendment bar the
imposition of the death penalty upon reconviction after an initial conviction, set aside on
appeal, in which the trial court imposed a statutorily mandated life sentence when the capital
sentencing jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict?
(2) Is a capital defendant's life and liberty interest in the imposition of a life sentence by
operation of state law, following a capital sentencing hearing in which the sentencing jury
fails to reach a unanimous verdict, violated when his first conviction is later overturned and
the state seeks and obtains a death sentence on retrial?
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JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE
Byron R. White, Longtime Justice And a Football Legend, Dies at 84
The New York Times
April 16, 2002
Linda Greenhouse
Byron R. White, the football legend who
became one of the longest serving justices
of the United States Supreme Court, died
yesterday in Denver. He was 84, and the
only living former Supreme Court justice.
The cause was complications from
pneumonia, a statement from the
Supreme Court said. When Justice White
stepped down nine years ago after 31
years on the court, he was the last veteran
of the liberal era of Chief Justice Earl
Warren. Though he was then the court's
sole remaining Democrat, he was in many
ways more at home in the conservative era
of Chief Justice William H Rehnquist.
Joining the court in 1962 at the height of
its liberal activism under Chief Justice
Warren, Justice White was often in dissent
during his early years as a justice and
assumed a position of influence only after
a series of appointments by Republican
presidents shifted the court in a more
conservative direction.
"Eventually, the court changed, society
changed, the issues changed," Kate Stith
Cabranes, a Yale Law School professor
and one of his former law clerks, said after
his retirement. "Byron White didn't
change."
He cast dissenting votes in Miranda v.
Arizona, the 1966 landmark decision that
required a police officer to inform a
suspect of his right to remain silent and to
consult with a lawyer, and in Roe v. Wade,
the 1973 decision that established a
constitutional right to abortion. Although
he gradually came to accept the Miranda
doctrine, Justice White never reconciled
himself to Roe v. Wade and continued to
dissent as the court applied and affirmed
that decision over the years.
He found himself much more at home in
the conservative 1980's and 1990's, writing
majority opinions that cut back on the
scope of federal civil rights laws, that
upheld state laws prohibiting homosexual
sex between consenting adults, and that
permitted the use of evidence obtained
with defective search warrants.
But no ideological label ever fit Justice
White comfortably. Committed to the use
of federal power to eradicate the legacy of
school segregation, he wrote majority
opinions upholding wide-ranging
desegregation orders for Northern school
districts and affirming the power of
federal judges to order a school district to
increase taxes to pay for the school
improvements necessary to make an
integration plan work.
He also believed that with power came
accountability, filing a strong dissent from
a 1982 decision that gave presidents
absolute immunity from suits for damages
for their official actions. He dissented
from the court's 1983 decision in the
Chadha case, which invalidated the
legislative veto, a device widely used by
Congress to block executive branch
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actions. "The history of separation-of-
powers doctrine is also a history of
accommodation and practicality," he
wrote, objecting to the majority's
insistence on maintaining the barrier
between legislative and executive power.
After his retirement, Justice White sat
occasionally as a visiting judge on federal
appeals courts and served in 1998 as the
chairman of a special commission that
studied the structure of the federal
appellate system. Last year, in failing
health, he closed his chambers in
Washington and moved with his wife,
Marion, to their native Colorado.
A sports hero, Rhodes scholar, successful
lawyer, triumphant political organizer and
director of Robert F. Kennedy's Justice
Department -- Byron R. White had been
all of these before his friend John F.
Kennedy named him to the Supreme
Court in 1962.
Only 44 at the time of his appointment,
Justice White was one of the youngest
people ever named to the court, and his
31-year tenure was one of the longest in
the court's history; among 20th-century
justices, only Hugo L. Black, William 0.
Douglas and William J. Brennan Jr. served
longer.
President Kennedy, calling his nominee
"the ideal New Frontier judge," said
Byron White "excelled in everything he
has attempted." That was an
understatement about a life that had a
storybook quality -- so much so that his
decades on the court sometimes appeared
more an anticlimax than a crowning
achievement.
Juggling Athletic and Legal Worlds
Raised in a small Colorado town by
parents who never graduated from high
school, Justice White was educated on
scholarships, a gifted scholar-athlete who
outshone the competition in both fields.
He was the only person to become both a
member of the College Football Hall of
Fame, to which he was elected in 1954,
and a law clerk to the Chief Justice of the
United States.
In the full glare of national publicity, he
juggled his two worlds to a degree that
would be inconceivable today. In 1938,
having deferred his Rhodes Scholarship
for a semester to play a season of
professional football with the Pittsburgh
Pirates (later called the Steelers), he
received the National Football League's
highest-ever salary, $15,800, and led the
league in rushing, a feat he duplicated two
years later, when he took a semester off
from Yale Law School to play for the
Detroit Lions.
A stellar law school career, interrupted by
Navy service in World War II as well as by
football, was capped by a year as a law
clerk to Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson
during the court's 1946 to 1947 term.
Only 15 years later, Byron White became
the first Supreme Court law clerk to
return as a justice.
His own judicial legacy remained a
complex and somewhat ambiguous one.
He never achieved the stardom or public
recognition on the Supreme Court that he
had received earlier, not that he sought
either at any point in his life. An
authentic, if reluctant, celebrity in an era
before fame became an everyday
commodity, he viewed with intense
distaste, for the rest of his life, the media
speculation that attended his every move
as a young man. His dislike of the
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nickname Whizzer, which the
sportswriters had bestowed on him and
which he could never quite manage to
shake, was legendary.
"Byron would have been just as happy, I
think he might have preferred -- if he
played with 21 other players in an empty
stadium," one of his University of
Colorado teammates commented many
years later to Justice White's biographer,
Prof. Dennis J. Hutchinson of the
University of Chicago Law School.
A thesis of the biography, "The Man Who
Once Was Whizzer White" (fhe Free
Press, 1998), was that a driving force of
Justice White's adult life was the effort to
"seal off his athletic past" and to be
accepted on his chosen terms, as a lawyer.
The book's title referred to an incident
early in 1961, when Mr. White, the deputy
attorney general in the new Kennedy
administration, was having lunch in a
restaurant near the Department of Justice.
"Say, aren't you Whizzer White?" the
waitress asked. After a moment, he replied
in a soft voice, "I was."
The difficulty in categorizing him came in
part from the fact that Justice White was
motivated not by ideology but by a
multifaceted vision of the American
system that included a strong yet
politically accountable federal government
and, a Supreme Court that deferred to
judgments reached by Congress and the
executive branch. "Judges have an
exaggerated view of their role in our
polity," he said once.
Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, a Yale Law
School classmate who later served with
him in the Justice Department, recalled in
an article marking the justice's 25th
anniversary on the court that his friend's
hallmark both as a student and as a judge
was "a healthy skepticism -- a probing
questioning of premises and an insistence
on conclusions reached by small and
visible steps in a rational process as
opposed to giant leaps of faith."
Mr. Katzenbach wrote that Justice White's
work on the court reflected his "belief that
hard work and determination can lead to
success, and a lack of sympathy for those
who abuse power and privilege as well as
for those who whine about bad luck"
Justice White's own luck was splendid. As
a young man, he encountered John
Kennedy twice within a few years: once
[on the Riviera were bother were
vacationing in the spring of 1939] just
before World War II, and again in the
Pacific in 1942, where both were Navy
lieutenants. It was Lieutenant White, an
intelligence officer, who was assigned to
write the official report of the sinking of
Kennedy's torpedo boat, PT-109, by a
Japanese destroyer. The two men
established a bond that eventually resulted
in Mr. White's Supreme Court
appointment.
Byron Raymond White was born on June
8, 1917, in Fort Collins, Colo., and grew
up in Wellington in northern Colorado.
His father, Albert White, was a branch
manager for a lumber supply company
and also served as mayor. As a child,
Byron worked in the nearby sugar beet
fields.
"There was very little money around
Wellington," Mr. White said at the time of
his Supreme Court appointment.
"Everybody worked for a living.
Everybody."
The University of Colorado offered a
scholarship to the top student in the
graduating class of every high school in
the state, and Mr. White was first in his
five- member senior class.
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At the university, he excelled both in class,
where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa
in his junior year, and in sports, where he
starred in basketball and baseball as well
as football, winning a total of seven letters
as well as all-conference honors in every
sport he played. The Colorado football
team was undefeated in his final season,
and Mr. White, who was a star punter and
passer as well as a halfback, led the nation
in scoring, rushing and total offense. By
the time he graduated, as valedictorian of
the class of 1938, the national press had
long since discovered Whizzer White and
was filled with speculation about his
prospects.
To Oxford and Back
Awarded a Rhodes Scholarship for study
at Oxford, he deferred until the spring
semester to play a season with the
Pittsburgh Pirates. He led the National
Football League in rushing, with 567 yards
in 11 games.
He began studying law at Oxford in
January 1939 but returned to the United
States soon after the war began in
September. He entered Yale Law School
that fall and earned the highest grades in
the firt-year class, but he turned down an
editorship of The Yale Law Journal and
took a leave of absence to play football
with the Detroit Lions. He played for two
seasons, and again led the league in
rushing in 1940.
Returning to Yale Law School after the
war, he received his degree in 1946 and
moved to Washington to begin his year as
a law clerk. John Kennedy was also a new
arrival to Washington in 1946, beginning
his career in Congress, and the two men
were soon reunited.
Also that year, he married Marion Stearns,
his college sweetheart. She was the
granddaughter of a Colorado governor
and the daughter of Robert L. Stearns, the
dean of the law school at the University of
Colorado and later the university's
president. Mrs. White survives him, as do
their children, Charles Byron White and
Nancy White Lippe, and six
grandchildren.
In 1947, the Whites returned to Colorado.
He joined a Denver law firm, Lewis,
Grant, Newton, Davis & Henry (now
known as Davis, Graham & Stubbs),
remaining there for 14 years and thriving
in a general commercial practice. His
clients ranged from individuals with
zoning disputes to IBM, and other major
corporations.
His partners liked to tell about Mr.
White's first criminal case, in which he
successfully defended a man charged with
passing a bad check. He then accepted the
client's thanks and his check, which was
worthless.
Mr. White resisted serious involvement in
politics until Kennedy, now a senator,
asked him for help in the early stages of
his campaign for the White House in
1960. Mr. White organized Colorado-for-
Kennedy clubs and brought the state's
delegation to the Democratic National
Convention into the Kennedy column. At
the request of Kennedy's brother Robert,
he then took charge of the national
Citizens for Kennedy organization during
the general election campaign.
President-elect Kennedy offered Mr.
White the job of deputy attorney general,
the No. 2 position in the Justice
Department that Robert Kennedy would
head as attorney general. Mr. White was in
charge of the day-to-day administration,
recruiting lawyers for top positions,
overseeing the department's initiatives in
Congress, and taking an active hand in
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selecting nominees for 70 new federal
judgeships.
With the civil rights struggle accelerating
in the South, lvr. White monitored federal
efforts to quell the growing violence that
accompanied the freedom rides, sit-mis
and marches. He went to Alabama to
supervise 400 federal marshals and
deputies sent to restore order in the state
in May 1961.
When President Kennedy learned in
March 1962 that Justice Charles E.
Whittaker was about to leave the court,
Byron White was his top choice as a
nominee. Mr. White expressed little
enthusiasm when first Mr. Katzenbach
and then Robert Kennedy called him to
test his interest, but he agreed.
The Senate quickly confirmed the
nomination and on April 16, Mr. White
took his seat as an associate justice. When
he retired 31 years later, he was the only
remaining justice to have been appointed
by a Democratic president.
The change from his active life in the
world of law and politics was abrupt. In a
1988 speech, Justice White said somewhat
plaintively that life on the court had its
"excruciating" aspects. "Where else can
one be so isolated and alone, yet turn
from hero to heel or from heel to hero in
just 10 pages or so?" he asked. "Where
else does the telephone ring so seldom?"
It took him barely two months to file his
first dissenting opinion, in which he struck
a tone and expressed a viewpoint from
which he would hardly ever waver. The
case was Robinson v. California, in which
a 6-to-2 majority declared unconstitutional
a California law that made it a crime for a
person to be a narcotics addict, even in
the absence of proof of the sale or
possession of illegal drugs. Making the
"status" of addiction itself a crime violated
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, the
majority ruled.
It was the first time the court had used the
Eighth Amendment to overturn a state
criminal conviction. Justice White's
dissenting opinion said, in part: "I fail to
see why the court deems it more
appropriate to write into the Constitution
its own abstract notions of how best to
handle the narcotics problem, for it
obviously cannot match either the States
or Congress in expert understanding."
Justice White was often inclined to
support the prosecution in criminal cases,
but that was only one theme to emerge in
this early opinion. The other was the
court's duty to defer, except in the face of
an express constitutional provision to the
contrary, to the policy judgments reached
by institutions of government that were
directly responsive to majority will. At
most, in his view, the court's job was to
ensure that the rest of government
functioned as it was intended to.
A Warning in Dissenting Opinions
In dissenting opinions, he often warned
the court against "the unrestrained
imposition of its own, extraconstitutional
value preferences," as he said in dissent in
a 1986 case that reaffirmed the right to
abortion. His original dissenting opinion
in Roe v. Wade said: "As an exercise of
raw judicial power, the court perhaps has
authority to do what it does today, but in
my view its judgment is an improvident
and extravagant exercise of the power of
judicial review that the Constitution
extends to this court." If he had any
personal views on the abortion question,
he never expressed them.
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In contests between federal authority and
state power, he almost always voted for
the federal side, perhaps applying lessons
learned in the Justice Department dealing
with recalcitrant Southern governors.
In disputes between the government and
the press, he took the government's side,
writing a series of majority opinions in the
1970's that rejected any argument by the
press of the need for special treatment.
His opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes in
1972 rejected the argument that the First
Amendment shielded journalists from
having to disclose their confidential
sources to a grand jury. A majority of the
states subsequently passed laws providing
such protection.
Although he joined the majority opinion
in New York Times v. Sullivan, the 1964
decision that created a First Amendment
shield for the press against libel suits by
public officials, he later said he regretted
his vote. "It is difficult to argue that the
United States did not have a free and
vigorous press before the rule in New
York Times was announced," he wrote in
a 1985 opinion.
At the same time, he disagreed with the
majority in a 1991 case, Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, which upheld an Indiana law that
banned nude dancing. In Justice White's
view, the performances were a form of
expression deserving of First Amendment
protection. "That the performances in the
Kitty Kat Lounge may not be high art, to
say the least, and may not appeal to the
court, is hardly an excuse for distorting
and ignoring settled doctrine," he wrote in
a dissent. "The court's assessment of the
artistic merits of nude dancing
performances should not be the
determining factor in deciding this case."
The impatience that Justice White
expressed in that opinion with efforts by
the government to control private
behavior was not apparent in his majority
opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, the 1986
decision that rejected a claim of
constitutional protection for consensual
homosexual acts. The 5-to-4 decision
upheld a Georgia law making homosexual
sodomy a crime. Given that half the states
maintained similar criminal prohibitions,
justice White wrote, the argument for a
fundamental constitutional right to engage
in homosexual sex "is, at best, facetious."
His opinion continued: "Nor are we
inclined to take a more expansive view of
our authority to discover new
fundamental rights imbedded in the Due
Process Cause. The court is most
vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no
cognizable roots in the language or design
of the Constitution."
Bowers v. Hardwick was probably the one
opinion of Justice White's that was best
known to the general public. An opinion
that was less well known, but that many
scholars regarded as his most important in
terms of the subsequent development of
legal doctrine, came in 1976 in a racial
discrimination case called Washington v.
Davis.
That case was a challenge to a
standardized examination used by the
District of Columbia Police Department
for recruiting and promoting police
officers. While there was no proof that the
department intended to screen out black
candidates, the test had a discriminatory
effect, with blacks failing it at four times
the rate of whites.
The question for the court was whether
this discriminatory impact violated the
Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection. The answer, provided in
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Justice White's majority opinion, was no;
proof that the government was
intentionally discriminating, not just
taking action that happened to have a
discriminatory effect, was an essential
element of a violation of the
Constitution's equal protection guarantee,
the court said. Washington v. Davis was
sharply criticized by civil-rights advocates.
It proved to be an influential opinion in a
variety of contexts, shifting the focus of
the court's scrutiny of government
behavior to the government's purpose
rather than the ultimate result.
A Presence on the Bench
Justice White wrote important decisions in
criminal law throughout his tenure on the
court. He joined the majority in 1972 that
invalidated the nation's death penalty laws,
as well as the majority opinions four years
later that permitted capital punishment to
resume under state laws restructured to
overcome the court's objections. In 1977,
he wrote the majority opinion in Coker v.
Georgia, holding that the death penalty
was an unconstitutional penalty for rape.
His majority opinion in United States v.
Leon in 1984, permitting prosecutors to
use some evidence that was obtained
illegally but in "good faith," accomplished
a major objective of the Justice
Department under President Ronald
Reagan. But he also voted against the
federal government often enough that his
position could not be taken for granted.
He wrote the majority opinion in a 1992
case, Jacobson v. United States,
overturning a child pornography
conviction on the ground that the
government had induced the defendant
into buying material that he would not
have bought on his own.
Justice White completed his opinion-
writing assignments quickly and usually
carried more than his share of the
workload during a Supreme Court term.
His majority opinions tended to be spare
to the point of obscurity, devoid of the
rhetorical flourishes that he seemed to
save for his dissents.
Virtually alone among the justices, he
frequently dissented in writing from a
decision not to hear a case. In another
singular practice, he refused to read
portions of his opinions from the bench,
announcing only the result but sharing
none of the rationale. Asked why he did
not participate with the other justices in
the public opinion-reading ceremony, he
once replied that he considered it a "waste
of time."
He could be gruff and intimidating on the
bench, asking probing and sometimes
disconcerting questions of lawyers, and
rarely tipping his hand on how he thought
the case should come out. He often tried
to help inexperienced lawyers focus their
argument, but he could be exasperated if
they did not even know enough to grasp
his helping hand, swiveling in his chair to
turn his back on the floundering lawyer.
But a clever parry to one of his questions
could bring an appreciative grin.
Well into his 60's, he played basketball
with his law clerks in the Supreme Court
gym, and they described him as an
aggressive and competitive player.
Those very traits linked the justice that
Byron White became to the athlete he had
been, in the view of Prof. John C. Jeffries
Jr. of the University of Virginia Law
School. Writing in 1999, Professor Jeffries
remarked on "how closely White's
strengths and weaknesses as a judge
echoed his talents as an athlete." "A keen
sense of contest dominated both
contexts," he maintained. " In both, White
was tough, hard-driving, and utterly
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purposive. In both, he shunned doubt.
The openness, unguardedness, and
sympathy for opposing concerns that
were missing from White the judge would
have disadvantaged White the athlete. The
frank admissions of uncertainty or
indecision so rarely encountered in
White's opinions would have been seen as
weakness in football -- or worse, as
whining excuses for poor performance."
Justice White announced his retirement
on March 19, 1993, choosing early spring
rather than the traditional end-of-term
announcement in late June to provide
time for a successor to be comfortably
seated in time for the next court term..
Justice White broke with tradition in
declining to hold a farewell news
conference. Instead, he made public a
letter to his colleagues, in which he
thanked them for their friendship and
announced his intent to sit from time to
time on federal appeals courts. "Hence,
like any other Court of Appeals judge," he
said, "I hope the court's mandates will be
clear, crisp, and leave those of us below
with as little room as possible for
disagreement about their meaning."
Copyright o 2002 The New York Times
Company
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Court's Unanimous View on White
Legal Times
April 22, 2002
The death last ewak of amnnr Justice Byron
Whii; zho serl 31 yawn on the herh, bmu*t
aomrnts fim all nine sitting justics. Chief
Justice Wlliam Rdquist's enrrks uem rnde
frm the bxh on A pril 16; the oes car in
anrtten staterEnts deased by the Supwne Coart
Chief Justice William Rehnquist: Before
we begin this morning, I want to pay
tribute to our friend and colleague Byron
R. White, a retired Justice of this Court,
who died yesterday morning in Colorado.
Byron White was nominated to the Court
by President Kennedy on April 3, 1962,
and was confirmed by the Senate eight
days later. He took the oath of office forty
years ago today, on April 16, 1962. He
was the 93rd Justice to serve on this
Court. Justice White was born and raised
in Colorado. He was a rare combination
of brilliant scholar and gifted athlete. He
attended the University of Colorado,
earning ten varsity letters and winning a
Rhodes scholarship to Oxford. Before
attending Oxford, Justice White played
professional football for the old
Pittsburgh Pirates. When he returned
from Oxford, Justice White attended Yale
Law School while playing football for the
Detroit Lions on weekends. He served as
an intelligence officer for the Navy during
WWII.
Justice White was graduated from Yale
Law School, earning the Cullen Prize for
high academic grades. He clerked for
Chief Justice Vinson and then returned
home to Colorado where he practiced law
for fourteen years, before joining the
Justice Department as deputy attorney
general to Robert Kennedy. Less than a
year later, President Kennedy named
Justice White to the Court.
Justice White was an able colleague and a
good friend. He came as close as any of us
to meriting Matthew Arnold's encomium
he "saw life steadily and saw it whole." All
of us who served with him feel a sense of
personal loss. Our condolences go out to
his wife, Marion, his two children and
their families.
At an appropriate time in the fall, the
traditional memorial observance of the
Court and the Bar will be held in this
Courtroom.
Justice John Paul Stevens: Byron White
was already a national hero to sports fans
when I first met him in Pearl Harbor
during World War II. I knew immediately
that he was the kind of person that I
would want as a friend. One of the great
blessings of my appointment to this Court
was the fruition of that wish. His
friendship is one of the treasures of this
tour of duty. He was the kind of person
for whom respect, admiration and
affection continue to increase as you learn
more about him. He was a true hero
during his naval service, a brilliant student
and law clerk, and outstanding member of
the profession, both in private practice
and as a public servant, and a great judge.
He was also blessed with an exceptionally
loving bride and a fine family of which he
was justly proud. I miss him.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor: Justice
White was an extraordinary man. His
intellect and contributions as a Justice of
the Supreme Court spanned 31 years, and
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his careful imprint will be felt for a great
many more years. He was as skilled in
public service as in professional football.
The people who reach the top in several
fields are few, indeed. Justice White was
one of the few and was an American
original.
Justice Antonin Scalia: Anyone who ever
met Byron White will recall his painfully
firm handshake: you had to squeeze back
hard or he would hurt you. I always
thought that was an apt symbol for his
role on the Court: he worked hard and
well, and by doing so forced you to do the
same. If there is one adjective that never
could, never would, be applied to Byron
White, it is wishy-washy. You always knew
where he stood; knew that he was not
likely to be moved; and hoped he was
lining up on your side of scrimmage. His
former colleagues have missed him since
his retirement nine years ago; we will miss
him more now. May he rest in peace.
Justice Anthony Kennedy- The Court
must strive in all it is and all it does to
reflect the integrity and the strength of a
Nation dedicated to the cause of freedom.
Byron White was himself a remarkable
personification of these values and this
purpose. His physical strength and stature
were powerful reminders of an even
greater strength of character, character
marked even from his youth by an
unyielding dedication to America and its
historic mission. Byron White honored
the Court and the law by his service here.
He honored the United States and its
people by his splendid, vibrant human
spirit.
Justice David Souter: Justice White was a
welcoming colleague and a solid friend.
Like the others here, I will miss him.
Justice Clarence Thomas: I am deeply
saddened to learn of the death of Justice
White. He was a great man, an
outstanding member of the Court, and a
wonderful friend. Virginia and I extend
our heartfelt sympathy to Marion and her
family. We will keep them in our thoughts
and in our prayers.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: At the
hearings on my nomination in July 1993, a
senator asked: "In what ways do you think
you might be like or different from Justice
White?" I answered: "The differences are
obvious; he is very tall and I am rather
small and surely I do not have his athletic
prowess." But "I hope I am like him in
dedication to the job and readiness to
work hard at it." I hold that hope high to
this very day.
I have a special fondness for and
appreciation of Justice White for another
reason. In my days as an advocate of equal
rights for men and women, I argued six
cases in the Supreme Court and prevailed
in five. If it had been up to Justice White,
I would have prevailed in all six. He voted
for the precise position I advocated every
time. He was the only Justice who did.
Justice Stephen Breyer: I was lucky to
have come to know Justice White in his
later years. Justice White was a great judge
and a thoroughly decent man-forceful,
engaging and strongly committed to
public service.
Copyright * 2002 NLP IP Company
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Sports of The Times; Justice Byron White: A Friend and a Mentor
The New York Times
April 21, 2002
Ira Berkow
Nick Lowery was having a tough time of
it. He had been a fine place-kicker in
college, at Dartmouth, and expected a
career booting balls in the National
Football League.
Not so quick. Lowery was cut 11 times
from eight N.F.L. teams before catching
on with the Kansas City Chiefs in 1980.
He beat out, of all people, Jan Stenerud,
who to this day is the only place-kicker in
the Pro Football Hall of Fame. And things
hardly got better for Lowery in his first
training camp with the Chiefs. He was the
butt of numerous pranks; he was not only
a rookie but a rookie from the Ivy League,
which carried with it a special kind of
contempt in that bruising environment.
One evening in training camp, for
example, he found fresh cow manure in
his bed.
He tried to talk to his new teammates, to
be one of the guys, but he encountered
resistance. Shortly after that, he went
home to McLean, Va., and sought out his
next-door neighbor on Hampshire Road,
who had become a friend and mentor.
The neighbor was Justice Byron R. White
of the United States Supreme Court.
White had also been a football player, a 6-
foot-1, 195-pound all-purpose all-
American back at Colorado. He picked up
the nickname Whizzer while leading the
nation in rushing, in scoring and in total
offense. He was also a star basketball
player, and led Colorado to a National
Invitation Tournament final at Madison
Square Garden. And he was a standout
baseball player and the valedictorian of his
graduating class.
He went to Yale Law School and to
Oxford as a Rhodes scholar. In between
he played football for one season with the
Pittsburgh Pirates (later the Steelers), in
1938, and two seasons with the Detroit
Lions, in 1939 and 1940. He led the
N.F.L. in rushing in 1938 and 1940. Then
he joined the Navy and went off to fight
in World War II.
So not only did Justice White know
something of the athletic world, he knew
something of the world.
"Nick," Lowery said White told him, his
strong bearing carrying a sense of gentle
strength, "the only way you are going to
get respect from those fellows is not by
anything you say, but what you can
deliver, how you perform on the field."
It was a simple piece of advice, but when
you are foundering, when emotions cloud
your perspective, it is such advice, and
coming from someone like Justice White,
that will make an impact. It did make one
on Nick Lowery.
That and other thoughts about Justice
White came back to Lowery upon learning
of the death Monday of his neighbor of
40 years. White, who served 31 years on
the Supreme Court, was 84.
Lowery recalled the first full year he spent
with Kansas City. He had a string of 11
field goals in 12 attempts, then kicked a
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game-winning field goal against the Lions.
The guys who had been most vicious in
riding him hugged him with tears in their
eyes, he recalled.
"It was exactly what Justice White had
been talking about," Lowery said.
Lowery said Justice White was reluctant to
talk about his athletic career -- "He would
always change the subject" -- and was
perhaps happiest discussing history and
people like Abraham Lincoln and Chief
Justice John Marshall.
"I was curious to see what kind of football
player he was," Lowery said, "and I was
able to get a film of a game he played
against Utah, my father's alma mater. It
was amazing. There was this one kickoff
return in which he almost ran backward in
the end zone, then cut straight upfield --
he cut like a knife -- and broke about
three tackles and completely faked out
four or five other players and raced in for
a touchdown. He was so fast, it looked
like the other players were moving in slow
motion."
He remembers Justice White talking about
Bill Bradley a few years after Bradley
became a senator. He said he admired
Bradley because it was important to have
balance in life, and not enough athletes
do. Bradley had achieved balance as a
student and an athlete, and he taught
English in a Harlem school before getting
involved in public service in government.
Lowery, now 45 and retired from football
since 1997 after a superb 17-year career
that included seasons with the Jets and the
Patriots, has taken that advice from White
to heart, too. He is a research fellow at the
Harvard Project on American Indian
Economic Development, and the first
professional athlete to graduate from the
Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard.
On occasion, Lowery saw glimpses of the
competitiveness that made White such a
great athlete. About 1977 Lowery was
playing basketball in the driveway with his
two brothers -- all of the Lowerys are over
6 feet -- and White's daughter, Nancy,
who was a field hockey star at Stanford.
"Justice White came by and we asked him
to play," Lowery said. "He said O.K. He
took off his tie and rolled up the sleeves
of his white shirt and played in his black
dress shoes. He was about 60 years old.
We played for over an hour, the justice
and me against the three of them. He was
tough, and we killed 'em. But we all had
fun. The next morning I saw Justice White
go to his car on crutches.
"I went over to him. What happened? He
said, 'Oh, I hurt my feet a little bit, but I'll
be all right.' And he was. A few days later
I saw him out in his yard mowing his lawn
in his shorts."
Copyright © 2002 The New York Times
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'So Much for History'
Compassion and Humor Formed the Byron White the Public Didn't See
Legal Times
April 22, 2002
Dennis J. Hutchinson
To those who knew Byron White, who
died last week two months before his 85th
birthday, the obituary accounts of what
the Associated Press called his storybook
life were accurate without being true. The
facts were all there-multiple
valedictorianships, Kennedys,
independent voting on the Supreme
Court-but in many respects, the man was
missing. Or he was reduced to a cartoon
character: athletic, physically menacing
until almost the end (a "crushing
handshake," declared Justice Antonin
Scalia), and a demeanor variously tagged
"gruff," "brusque," "abrupt," or "terse."
Yet, as I discovered when I began
researching a book-length portrait of him
almost 10 years ago, those who were
closest to him routinely summoned a
different descriptive inventory- "tender,"
"generous," "empathetic," "patient,"
"kind," "ironic." None of the words, or
the incidents to back them up, were
offered defensively. In fact, most of those
I interviewed seemed puzzled that the
public man was viewed otherwise.
Public and Private
Perhaps more than any other prominent
official of the day, Byron White
maintained an impregnable wall between
his public and private life. In an age of
celebrity, where even judges and chefs
have star quality approaching that of
actors and musicians, White was old
school with a vengeance. Having been
thrust into the limelight as a college
athlete and made a household name
before he turned 21, he knew the
emptiness of the limelight and the
triviality of those who tend to cast it.
Public acclain, from early on, was not an
achievement for White, but a distraction
at best and a burden at worst.
Hardened against the expectations of the
public spotlight from a young age, he
organized his early career to avoid it.
When he left his clerkship with Chief
Justice Fred Vinson in 1947, he told
friends he was returning to Colorado to
practice law, start a family, and keep my
name out. of the goddamn newspapers."
He accomplished all three, although he
devoted enormous amounts of time to
charity work, community service, and low-
level political work, usually at the precinct
level.
When the fledgling "John Kennedy for
President" campaign came calling in 1959,
White was a reluctant recruit. He had two
young children, a legal practice that was
successful but only just beginning to
flourish, and, still, no taste for public life.
But he believed profoundly in public
service, came to believe in Kennedy, and
sacrificed his privacy for the sake of the
candidate and the campaign. After serving
as the No. 2 man in the Department of
Justice (and often the de facto attorney
general when Robert Kennedy was at the
White House counseling his brother),
White was named to the Supreme Court
in 1962 at the age of 44. Again, he
hesitated when destiny called: The
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position would guarantee self-regulated
privacy, but judges play reactive roles in
government, and White later worried to
friends that he could have contributed
more to public service in an administrative
or executive position.
He nevertheless stayed on the bench for
31 years, longer than all but eight other
justices in the Court's history. Protected
by the Court's traditional self-enforced
isolation from press conferences and
other events not of his choosing, the
public perception of Byron White was
shaped by his aggressive questioning
during oral arguments and occasional
appearances at university events and moot
courts. Within the Court's private
precincts, and especially with family and
lifelong friends, there was the other White
who was warm, playful and, according to
one niece, "wickedly funny."
I enjoyed a glimpse of White's posture
toward negotiating the public-private line
five years ago at a reunion of former law
clerks in Denver. My daughter, then 17,
accompanied me, and during an informal
conversation with a few of the other
attendees, she asked White for advice on
where to purchase a genuine Western
Stetson hat. He provided two well-
informed recommendations. She
confessed that she was afraid that her high
school classmates might ridicule her if she
wore the hat to her suburban Chicago
high school.
He looked at her warmly, saying with an
almost intimate, conspiratorial tone, "If
you want to wear the hat, wear the hat. If
you don't want to wear it to school, then
you can drive there and leave it in your
car. And if someone asks you about it, tell
them it's none of their goddamn
business!" The final sentence was made
adamantly, but with a twinkle in the eye.
Judicious Irony
White enjoyed a sense of humor that was
ironic, often deadpan, and sometimes
offbeat. In the mid-1970s, as part of the
relentless celebration of the bicentennial
of the Constitution, Chief Justice Warren
Burger conceived the idea of a series of
short dramatic films to illustrate famous
Supreme Court cases. Congress
appropriated the money, the Judicial
Conference of the United States
underwrote the scheme, and numerous
federal judges were recruited to
Washington as historical advisers, script
consultants, and previewers of rough cuts.
Burger was especially concerned with the
narration. He summoned White to his
chambers to discuss the voice-over.
Burger wanted a voice of "great dignity
and authority," perhaps like Gregory Peck.
He asked White for suggestions. "What
about Archie Bunker?" White replied,
referring to the Carroll O'Connor
television character who defined blue-
collar Queens, N.Y., to viewers of the day.
Burger replied earnestly, "Who's he? Do
you think we could get him?" Burger's
attending staff desperately tried to avoid
exploding in laughter as White looked
without expression at his nominal boss.
White's humor was probably displayed
more often and more robustly with family,
with his annual fishing party, and with
lifelong friends. But there was another
side of the private Byron White that
touched many. In times of personal crisis,
especially involving health, White was
constantly on the phone providing
encouragement, sending flowers, or
jotting personal notes. Rex Lee, who
clerked for White from 1963 to 1964 and
later became solicitor general, told me that
during his two bouts with cancer White
was a daily source of support and
strength.
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"Justice White had a hard side-everybody
knows about that," Lee said before he
died. "But you don't know him unless you
know the other side, and he works pretty
hard to conceal it."
Acts of Kindness
White also concealed small acts of
compassion in connection with his work,
the best example of which I know
involved Herman Lodge, the lead plaintiff
in the important voting rights case, Rogs
v Lodge (1982). A few days before the oral
argument, Lodge telephoned the marshal's
office at the Supreme Court to ensure that
he and his busload of supporters (many of
them fellow plaintiffs) would have seats in
the courtroom. He was told curtly that
there were no reserved seats. Distraught,
he then called Nina Totenberg, a reporter
who had covered his case for months, and
asked her for help. She telephoned White
(her husband, former Sen. Floyd Haskell,
was a friend from Colorado) and
explained Lodge's plight. "He listened,
and sort of grunted, but was
noncommittal," Totenberg later recalled.
When Lodge contacted the Court again,
he was advised that space had been
allotted to his group, but there was no
explanation for the change in policy or its
application.
Many of White's acts of kindness reside
with his family, where they belong,
especially at this moment. But I have
interviewed many who knew him closely
and who have their own testimony,
although, out of respect for his privacy
and their own, the incidents remain
shielded from public view. There is one
final story that reveals a kindness,
delivered without soft soap to be sure, and
that shows a slice of the man and his self-
perspective.
Thinking Back
In early spring of 1993, I made an
appointment to visit White in Washington
to pay him the courtesy of letting him
know that I had signed a contract to write
a book about him. As soon as I revealed
my treachery, he slammed his massive
right hand down on his desk and
bellowed, "The hell you say!" Pause.
"Well," he went on, still a bit hot, "You're
on your own. I won't help. But I won't get
in the way either." He then seemed to
realize that he was overreacting-however
authentically-for someone who purports
not to care what anyone says about him.
The conversation shifted to chit-chat
about a recent meeting he had had with
"What's that little fella's name, you know,
the White House counsel?" (Only later in
the afternoon did I begin to suspect why
he met with someone in the White House-
a suspicion confirmed when White
announced his resignation from the
Supreme Court soon after.) "Bernard
Nussbaum," I answered.
"Yeah, that's it," he said. "Well, I was
talking to him, and he says, very proudly,
Mr. Justice, we're putting together the
best Department of Justice in the history
of the United States.' " White paused long
enough for me to engage in the same,
silent mental checklist that he had:
Nicholas Katzenbach, Burke Marshall,
Louis Oberdorfer, William Orrick,
Herbert "Jack" Miller, and other assistant
attorneys general recruited by White in the
spring of 1961-a dream team that even the
Kennedy skeptic Alexander Bickel later
called "the most brilliantly staffed
department in a long time."
White allowed the silent comparison to
sink in, leaned forward, and said in mock
astonishment, "Yes, he said that to me!"
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Another pause, then a broad, mutually
self-mocking smile: "Well, Dennis, so
much for history."
Copyright D 2002 NLP IP Company
REFLECTCIONS AT THE END OF THE 2001-2002 TERM
Retirement Rumors Swirl Around 3 Senior Justices
Houston Chronicle
July 7, 2002
Mark Helm
With the Supreme Court term ended,
rumors are swirling around the possibility
that one of the nine justices might retire.
Leading in the speculation are the court's
three most senior members, Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, 77, and Justices Sandra
Day O'Connor, 72, and John Paul
Stevens, 82.
"Many of these justices have been around
for a long time, so any year could be their
last," says Elliot Mincberg, a Supreme
Court expert for People for the American
Way, a liberal legal group.
Although Mincberg and other experts say
none of the justices has signaled any
intention of being ready to leave the court,
speculation surrounding the possible
retirement of the three has picked up
recently.
Last month, the Arizona Republic Web
site reported that Rehnquist might step
down "as early as summer."
Because Rehnquist calls Arizona home,
many politicians and interest groups took
the report seriously and immediately
began speculating on who might replace
the chief justice, who was appointed by
former President Nixon in 1972.
Some Senate Republicans worried that
President Bush fearing a tough
nomination battle in the Democratic-
controlled Senate might replace
Rehnquist, a strong conservative, with a
more moderate justice.
But less than 24 hours later, the rumor ran
out of steam when congressional sources
said the report resulted from a
misunderstanding between reporters and
officials from the office of Sen. Jon Kyl,
R-Ariz.
Rehnquist, who has been chief justice
since 1986 and has hinted in the past that
he might want to spend more time with
his family, did not comment on the
report. However, the court recently
announced that Rehnquist's administrative
assistant, Sally Rider, will continue in her
position for one more year, which would
not likely happen if he were leaving.
In January, O'Connor, whose moderate
vote often proves pivotal in a court evenly
divided between liberals and
conservatives, felt the need to end
speculation that she might be appointed
chief justice if Rehnquist were to retire.
"It's nonsense," she said, noting that she
was then 71. "That ought to quiet that
talk" O'Connor was appointed to the
court in 1981 by President Reagan. As for
retiring, O'Connor said, "I haven't made
that decision. Someday, somehow,
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somewhere. Nobody lives forever, for
God's sake."
The other justice often mentioned as a
possible retirement candidate is Stevens,
who was named by Gerald Ford in 1975.
At 82, Stevens is the oldest member of the
court and one of the most liberal. With
no apparent medical problems and great
enthusiasm for his job, Stevens has given
no hints he wants to leave.
"You have to remember that most
Supreme Court justices throughout
history have only retired when their
bodies force them to," Mincberg says.
But court watchers say political
calculations and court traditions may force
one of the justices to retire within the next
year.
David Garrow, a law professor at Emory
University in Atlanta, says an unwritten
rule in the Supreme Court is that two
justices don't retire in the same year, since
replacing both at the same time would be
a difficult task for the president and the
Senate.
Another unwritten rule is that justices
don't retire during presidential election
years, Garrow says. That leaves only this
year and next year for a justice to retire if
he or she doesn't want to wait until 2005
or 2006.
Court watchers also say that Rehnquist
may wait until after November's midterm
elections to announce his retirement,
hoping the Republicans will take back
control of the Senate, where the
Democrats now have a one-vote margin.
"The justices like people to think that
politics never plays a part in their
decisions to retire or not to retire, but the
truth is that often it's a major
consideration," says Mark Tushnet, a
constitutional law professor at
Georgetown University.
With the presidential election another year
away, Bush would have the time and
political backing to appoint a solid
conservative to replace Rehnquist if the
GOP is in charge of the Senate.
Among the top contenders for
appointment to the high court are White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales and
Miguel Estrada, a former staff attorney in
the Office of the Solicitor General.
Estrada is awaiting confinnation by the
Senate to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit.
Since many important cases are decided
on a 5-4 vote, both Republicans and
Democrats are anxiously awaiting the next
retirement.
"By changing one person, whether that
person be Rehnquist, O'Connor or
Stevens, the ideology of the court could
be completely transformed, and
everybody, including the justices, knows
it," Mincberg says.
Copyright © 2002 Houston Chronicle
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Judicial Intent; The Competing Visions of the Role of the Court
The New York Times
July 7, 2002
Linda Greenhouse
LABELS that once comfortably described
the range of views on the Supreme Court
don't work so well these days. "Liberal"
versus "conservative" means less than it
did back when old-fashioned liberals sat
on the court. And the new judicial
"activism" on the right has stripped much
usefulness from a handy insult once flung
exclusively at liberal judges.
Yet with the court deeply divided, there
remains a need to identify and analyze its
current dichotomies. In fact, two justices,
Antonin Scalia and Stephen G. Breyer,
spent much of the term just ended
engaged in a debate about how the court
should approach its work. It is in terms of
that debate, and in the competing visions
of the judicial role emerging from it, that
one of the most interesting and potentially
important fault lines on the current
Supreme Court can be understood. It is a
debate over text versus context. For
Justice Scalia, who focuses on text,
language is supreme, and the court's job is
to derive and apply rules from the words
chosen by the Constitution's framers or a
statute's drafters. For Justice Breyer, who
looks to context, language is only a
starting point to an inquiry in which a
law's purpose and a decision's likely
consequence are the more important
elements.
This debate is taking place not only in the
court's opinions but, significantly, in the
two justices' outside writing and speaking.
Not since the Roosevelt era, when Justice
Hugo L. Black (text) and Justice Felix
Frankfurter (context) battled over the
meaning of the Bill of Rights, has the
court had two justices willing to engage
each other -- and the public -- in a debate
over basic principles.
Justice Scalia's vision is the more familiar,
pungently expressed in 16 years of
Supreme Court opinions and through
much speaking and writing off the bench;
his 1995 Tanner Lectures at Princeton
became a book, "A Matter of
Interpretation." He is a seeker of bright
lines and boundaries, a transmitter of
rules, whether derived from the framers'
original understanding or from the
unannotated text of federal statutes.
For Justice Scalia, constitutional principles
are fixed, not evolving -- "The
Constitution that I interpret and apply is
not living, but dead," he declared at a
conference earlier this year -- and
Congress needs to be held to the words it
wrote, not to interpretations written by
committee aides or judges. "Our first
responsibility is to not to make sense of
the law -- our first responsibility is to
follow the text of the law," he said from
the bench. In his view, the Supreme
Court's job is to give lower court judges
not factors to weigh, but rules to apply.
For much of justice Breyer's eight years
on the court, his premises were not
equally clear, though it was obvious that
context, for him, counted far more than
rules. His tone was often diffident, his
doubts openly acknowledged.
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It was during the past term that Justice
Breyer presented an integrated theory of
the role he sees for the court in society
and for himself as a justice. Delivering
New York University Law School's James
Madison Lecture last October, he said
three principles should guide the court's
decision- making.
First was the purpose (as opposed to text)
of the constitutional provision or law
under review. Second was the likely
consequence of a decision, which he
contrasted to "a more 'legalistic' approach
that places too much weight upon
language, history, tradition and precedent
alone." Without mentioning Justice Scalia
by name, he said the "literalist" approach
leads to a result "no less subjective but
which is far less transparent than a
decision that directly addresses
consequences in constitutional terms."
Third, Justice Breyer said, the court
should bear in mind the Constitution's
overall objective, that of fostering
"participatory democratic self-
government." The court should be wary,
he said, about preempting a "national
conversation" in which new legal
understanding "bubbles up from below."
JUSTICE BREYER'S lecture did more
than clarify his own approach. It meant
that Justice Scalia was no longer the
solitary voice framing the debate on the
role of the court.
In an influential Harvard Law Review
article 10 years ago, Kathleen i. Sullivan
described "The Justices of Rules and
Standards." Justice Scalia was the
quintessential and self-defined justice of
rules. Justice Breyer was not on the court
then, but Professor Sullivan, now dean of
Stanford Law School, agreed last week
that he is the quintessential justice of
standards, an approach she defined as
"evolutionary, pragmatic, always asking
what makes sense, what would serve the
purpose of the law."
Neither approach carries an ideological
guarantee. Justice Black's rules (text) led
him to the liberal side of the spectrum,
while Justice Frankfurter's use of
standards (context) had a conservative tilt.
In recent cases, Justice Scalia's rules led
him to write -- over a dissent by Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist -- that for
the police to aim a thermal imaging device
at a home was a search for which the
framers would have required a warrant,
while Justice Breyer's satisfaction that a
school district's broad drug-testing policy
was the product of an authentically
democratic community debate led him to
align with the four more conservative
justices to uphold the policy.
Cases from last term illustrate the Breyer
versus Scalia debate in action. In US
Airways v. Barnett, a statutory case under
the Americans With Disabilities Act, for
example, the question was whether
seniority systems trump a disabled
worker's right to the "reasonable
accommodation" of transferring to a less
physically demanding job. Justice Breyer,
writing for the 5-to-4 majority, said the
answer was yes -- "ordinarily" (his italics).
There may be special circumstances that
make a disabled worker's requested
reassignment "reasonable" despite a more
senior employee's right to the position, he
said.
In dissenting, Justice Scalia said the
majority, "indulging its penchant for
eschewing clear rules that might avoid
litigation," had turned the disability act's
accommodation provision into a
"standardless grab bag." A seniority
system should always prevail, he said.
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The "penchant" Justice Scalia mentioned
was a reference to a case earlier in the
term. The question was what test a state
had to meet -- how dangerous a sexual
predator had to be -- to justify prolonged
civil confinement past the end of a
criminal sentence.
Because "an absolutist approach is
unworkable," the court should proceed
"deliberately and contextually," Justice
Breyer wrote for the 7-to-2 majority in
Kansas v. Crane. There must be "proof of
serious difficulty in controlling behavior"
on the part of the offender, he said,
adding that the court was not in a position
to define that mental state "with
mathematical precision."
"It is irresponsible to leave the law in such
a state of utter indeterminacy," Justice
Scalia said in dissent, adding that while the
majority "displays an elegant subtlety of
mind," the decision left trial judges
"without a clue as to how they are
supposed to charge the jury!"
On the first Monday of October, the
debate resumes.
Copyright © 2002 The New York Times
Company
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Rehnquist
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June 28, 2002
Joan Biskupic
When a Supreme Court justice is
particularly incensed about the majority's
decision, he or she might decide to upset
the court's usual decorum and read a
dissent from the raised mahogany bench.
At one time or another, most of the nine
justices have tried to grab attention this
way.
Not William Rehnquist.
The nation's chief justice, who marks 30
years on the court this year, puts his
dissents on paper and leaves it at that: no
railing, no personal attacks, no effort to
draw the limelight.
Why should he do differently? Since
joining the court in 1972, the gruff aide to
President Nixon has seen Republican
presidents make appointments that
gradually made a liberal Supreme Court
more conservative, like him. Even as his
tenure on the bench appears to be
winding down, Rehnquist, 77, seems
comfortable that the legal and political
winds that shape social policy are blowing
his way.
The court term that ended Thursday
offered evidence of that. Rehnquist
dissented in some key cases in which the
court's middle-ground coalition, usually
led by Sandra Day O'Connor, carried the
day. But he got his way in areas that
matter most to hin The court endorsed
more public funding of religious
institutions, expanded states' immunity
from citizen lawsuits, and enhanced
government powers for more searches on
mass transportation and in public schools.
It also narrowly interpreted the legal rights
of disabled people in a series of rulings
that contrast with the interpretation of
civil rights under Chief Justices
EarlWarren (1953-69) and Warren Burger
(1969-86).
Rehnquist, a tall, broad-shouldered
Wisconsin native who disdains grand legal
theories, has presided over a remarkable
shift in U.S. law. After several years in
which he was on the court's fringe, many
of his ideas now are reflected in its
conservative majority. It's not so much
that he has been a great persuader, it's
been more a case of perfect timing. His 30
years have coincided with a national
political turn toward the right and have
produced a clear break from a time when
the court was an engine of social change.
"He is not the radical outsider he once
was," says Richard Fallon, a law professor
at Harvard University. "He leads a
conservative court in a conservative
political age."
Rehnquist has suggested that he will
remain on the court for at least another
year, but he also has dropped hints that he
is unlikely to stay beyond the 2004
presidential election, meaning that
President Bush could get to choose the
chief's successor. Rehnquist -- along with
O'Connor, 72, and John Paul Stevens, 82
are most often mentioned as potential
retirees. None of them, however, has
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indicated any plans to retire before the
2002-03 term.
But with Rehnquist's tenure likely winding
down, scholars are beginning to assess his
legacy. Several rulings this term highlight
the areas in which Rehnquist has seen or
guided a transformation during the past
30 years:
* States' rights. Rehnquist once was a
lonely dissenter in trying to protect states
from being sued when they violated
people's federal rights. Today, the majority
consistently overturns congressional
legislation that it believes treads on the
states. That was the case this term in a
ruling that said regulators cannot
intervene in cruise ship complaints against
state pots.
* Public funding of religious activities and
groups. In the early 1970s, over
Rehnquist's dissent, the court erected
significant limits on when public money
could be spent at private religious schools.
Those restrictions have been eased
through the years. Now the court's
majority, as was the case in Thursday's
ruling that supported school voucher
programs, says government can provide
money for religious schools on the same
basis as secular schools. This decision's
author Rehnquist.
* The death penalty. Five months after
Rehnquist joined the court, the majority
struck down all state capital punishment
laws, saying they were being imposed
arbitrarily. He dissented. Today the court,
like Rehnquist, firmly backs the
constitutionality of the death penalty.
But several justices, breaking with
Rehnquist, have shown concern about the
fairness of state procedures and who is
subject to the ultimate penalty. The court
ruled this term that the mentally retarded
should be exempt from execution and that
juries, not judges, should decide whether
the aggravating factors of a crime warrant
the death penalty. Rehnquist was the only
justice to disagree with both rulings. The
number of death-row inmates who take
advantage of the recent rulings will
depend on how courts interpret a 1989
decision backed by Rehnquist that limits
prisoners' ability to appeal, based on new
high court rulings.
*, Defendants' appeals. In the 1970s and
'80s, the majority routinely let condemned
prisoners challenge the constitutionality of
their cases in federal court. Rehnquist said
this undermined the finality of state
sentences and thwarted justice. His view
that prisoners should be limited in their
federal appeals now prevails.
That was reinforced this term by the
court's decision in the case of a Virginia
murderer who claimed that he had
received inadequate counsel because his
lawyer previously represented the murder
victim. The conservative justices --
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Antonin Scalia,
Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas -
formed the majority that said such a
conflict of interest is permissible as long
as there is no evidence that it harmed the
lawyer's representation.
There are areas in which Rehnquist has
remained in the minority, notably on
privacy and personal liberties. In 1973, he
was one of two justices who dissented in
Roe u. Wade, which established a
constitutional right to abortion. Rehnquist
has continued to protest that decision and
others that have struck down state's
abortion restrictions. In recent years, he
has been joined consistently by Scalia and
Thomas.
Those three also dissented from the 1996
decision that invalidated an amendment to
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the Colorado Constitution prohibiting
local laws that protected gay men and
lesbians from discrimination. They
disagreed with the majority's view that the
Colorado amendment seemed only the
product of animus toward gay people.
Privacy law has been the overriding area
in which Rehnquist has been unsuccessful,
legal analysts say. "In other cases, he has
had a quiet sense of confidence," says
Kevin Worthen, a law professor at
Brigham Young University. "He seemed
to know it was going his way." Rehnquist
appeared to reflect that self-assurance in
1985, when he dissented in a ruling that
allowed Congress to impose minimum-
wage laws on states. He said his federalism
principles would, in time, "command the
support of a majority."
Rehnquist was an assistant attorney
general in Nixon's Justice Department
when John Marshall Harlan retired from
the court in 1971. Rehnquist was part of
the team charged with helping to find a
successor for Harlan and Justice Hugo
Black, who also was retiring.
As nominees were vetted and political
complications arose with some, Rehnquist
himself came under consideration. Former
Nixon aides have recounted how the
president initially was wary of the blunt
Midwesterner who wore Hush Puppies
and bushy sideburns. Nixon mistakenly
called him "Renchburg." But Nixon was
impressed by his credentials -- Rehnquist
had graduated first in his class from
Stanford's law school in 1952 and had
clerked for Justice Robert Jackson -- and
his law-and-order reputation.
The president wound up naming
Rehnquist and Lewis Powell (who retired
in 1987) to fill the seats. The Senate
approved Rehnquist 68-26. He took his
oath Jan. 7, 1972.
Fourteen years later, President Reagan
promoted him to chief justice, and
Rehnquist became only the third sitting
associate justice in U.S. history to be
elevated to the center chair.
At the time, Reagan was stocking the
court with other conservatives, beginning
with O'Connor in 1981. The first female
justice was a classmate of Rehnquist's at
Stanford and became a frequent ally.
Reagan named Scalia to the court in 1986
and Kennedy in 1988. The first President
Bush appointed Thomas in 1991, ensuring
Rehnquist a majority in many cases.
"The influence of one justice on the
others is never as important as the
identities of all nine justices. But, that said,
Rehnquist has been very influential," says
John Jeffries, dean of the University of
Virginia's law school. "He was willing ...
to stake out strong positions and
confidently defend them." Jeffries, a
former clerk to Powell who has written
about the court, says as far as he knows,
Rehnquist "never burned a bridge, no
matter how much he disagreed with
another justice."
That has set Rehnquist apart from his
predecessor as chief, Burger, who had a
reputation as petty and constantly at odds
with some colleagues. In their
conferences, Rehnquist lets each justice
speak once on a case before anyone
speaks a second time, and he tries to
evenly distribute the opinion-writing.
He is as predictable in his personal
business as he is in his rulings. Each
morning, he walks around the exterior of
the court to exercise his bad back, usually
unrecognized by tourists. When the
justices temporarily had to move last fall
because of the anthrax scare, he had his
driver take him to the Supreme Court
everyday for his walk.
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The chief was squarely with the majority
in the court's biggest decision in recent
years: Bush s. Goe, the December 2000
ruling that stopped recounts of
presidential ballots in Florida and gave
George W. Bush the White House.
Analysts say the ruling reflected a bold
assertion: that in its view, the court was
the government's most indispensable
institution.
But more than anything, Rehnquist's court
is characterized by its zeal to curb federal
power and to leave the problems of
society -- its poor, weak and
disadvantaged -- to the states. In a 1995
opinion, Rehnquist said the court had
deferred more to Congress. But unless it
drew the line, "there will never be a
distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local."
Biography
Age: 77, born Oct. 1, 1924.
Education: Stanford University, B.A.,
1948, M.A., 1948; Harvard University,
M.A., 1950; Stanford University Law
School, LL.B., 1952.
Career: Law clerk to Supreme Court
Justice Robert Jackson, 1952-53; assistant
U.S. attorney general, Office of Legal
Counsel, 1969-71.
Supreme Court: Appointed by President
Nixon, took judicial oath Jan. 7, 1972;
appointed chief justice by President
Reagan, took oath Sept. 26, 1986.
Family Married Natalie Cornell, Aug. 29,
1953; she died in 1991. One son, two
daughters.
Source: U.S. Supreme Court
Copyright a 2002 Gannett Company, Inc.
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Clarence Thomas After Ten Years: Some Reflections
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2002
Stephen J. Wermeil
Introduction
When Justice Clarence Thomas was
nominated in 1991 to the United States
Supreme Court by the first President
George Bush, even sophisticated
observers of the judiciary knew relatively
little about him beyond the line items on
his resume. He had progressed rapidly in
conservative political circles, but the
details of his thinking on legal issues of
the day were not widely known.
My memory is still fresh of how little
Thomas revealed of himself in his
confirmation hearings before the Senate
Judiciary Committee ten years ago.' This
was even the case in the first phase,
before the surfacing of sexual harassment
allegations.2 My recollection is so vivid
I The clarity of my memory is due to personal
circumstances. As the Supreme Court
correspondent for the Wall Street Journal, I
covered every confirmation from Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor through Justice David H. Souter.
When Justice Thomas was nominated, I wrote a
profile of him, and then left the Journal to take a
teaching position as a visiting professor at William
and Mary Law School. My first class was a seminar
on the Supreme Court, which I began with a focus
on the nomination and confirmation process. The
hearings on the Thomas nomination fit perfectly
into my own professional transition.
2 See Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, United States Senate, 102d Cong. (1991)
[hereinafter Nomination of Judge Clarence
Thomas]. The initial hearings on the nomination
were held by the Senate Judiciary Committee with
Thomas testifying on September 10-13, 1991. The
that it seems almost impossible that ten
years have passed.
It is fair game to muse about what we
have learned of Justice Clarence Thomas
in his first decade on the Supreme Court.
In particular, it is worth asking whether
the murky image has given way in any
respect to a clearer vision of who he is.
This essay is intended to reflect briefly on
a few aspects of Justice Thomas' tenure.
This essay is not intended to be a
comprehensive examination of Thomas'
record and thus, may raise more questions
than it seeks to answer.
I.
From almost his first day on the Supreme
Court, Justice Thomas was branded a
"Scalia clone," a reference to the
frequency with which Thomas votes with
his senior conservative colleague, Justice
Antonin Scalia.' The label is unfair to
Thomas.
hearings were resumed on October 11-13, 1991,
after allegations surfaced that Thomas engaged in
sexual harassment of Anita Hill.
3 See Richard Careli, Thomas' Decisions Show
Archconservative Bent, St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Feb. 27, 1992, at 1C (quoting New York lawyer
Cameron Clark, "It looks to me as if he's going to
become a clone of Justice Scalia, confirming the
worst fears of those who tend to be more liberal");
see also Aaron Epstein, Conservatives Unhappy
with Souter; Bush's Appointee Helped Produce
Defeats for President, Orange County Reg., July 1,
1992, at A12 (quoting then University of
Minnesota Law School Professor Suzanna Sherry).
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No question exists that the two men see
eye-to-eye quite frequently in Supreme
Court decisions. For their first nine years
together, the Harvard Law Review
calculated that Scalia and Thomas agreed
in 89.5% of the cases they decided.! The
total for the decade may be even a bit
higher, since the National Law Journal
puts their agreement at 96% during the
last term, which was not included in the
Harvard Law Review calculation.'
These numbers, however, are meaningless
when considered in isolation. While the
total is the highest level of agreement on
the current Court, it is not significantly
greater than its closest competitors.
Consider that the same Harvard Law
Review study shows 84.3% agreement
between Justice David H. Souter and
Justice Stephen Breyer during their first
six terms together, and 83.9% between
Justice Souter and Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg in their first seven terms.' No
one has suggested that these Justices are
simply marching in lockstep together and
not thinking for themselves. Additionally,
there is an even more telling comparison.
During their last decade on the Supreme
Court together, Justices William J.
Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall voted
together in 94.3% of cases.' Yet, liberal
admirers of the two men would surely be
appalled at, and quick to reject,
suggestions that Marshall was just a
Brennan clone.
See The Supreme Court, 1999 Term: The
Statistics, Table II(B), 114 Harv. L. Rev. 390, 406
(Table II(B)) (2000) [hereinafter 1999 Term].
5 See Marcia Coyle, Voting Alignments on the
Supreme Court, Nat'1 LJ., Aug. 6, 2001, at C3.
6 See 1999 Term, supra note 4, at 406.
7 See The Supreme Court 1989 Term: Leading
Cases: The Supreme Court in the Eighties: A
Statistical Retrospective, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 367,
370 (Table II(B)) (1990).
This essay will discuss that there are
numerous constitutional questions on
which Thomas has expressed his own
views, or at least views in which he was
speaking for himself rather than simply
following the lead of Justice Scalia
II.
After ten years, it is only fair to examine
Justice Thomas as an independent thinker
by looking at the jurisprudential territory
he has staked out for himself. Several
themes emerge when Justice Thomas is
analyzed in this manner.
A.
First, Clarence Thomas would have been
more comfortable as a justice nominated
in 1791 or 1891, instead of 1991. What he
seems to hold most dear is the original
intent of the Framers of the Constitution.
He seems most comfortable quoting
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison,
rather than the decisions that have shaped
the modem jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court in the last fifty years.9 He seems
like a man out of place in many ways who
would have fit better into the doctrine of
another time.
However, there is more to Justice Thomas
than a compulsive devotion to the original
intent of the Constitution. His opinions
reflect a strong respect for the
organizational order that the Constitution
created, which leads him to be concerned
perhaps more than anything else with
maintaining and preserving the power and
8 See discussion infra Part IIA-C (discussing
Thomas' views on federalism, abortion and state's
rights).
9 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 126-31
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (engaging in a
lengthy examination of the limits the Framers
intended to place on the equitable powers of the
federal courts).
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authority of the States. His view
emphasizes the theory of Federalism, that
all powers were intended to be given to
the States by the Constitution, unless
expressly given to the Federal
government.o Thomas writes about these
views repeatedly, mostly as concurring or
dissenting opinions."
A major example of Thomas' belief in the
preeminence of the States is his stance on
the term limits debate. In United States
Term Limits v. Thornton, 2 where the
Court held that the States could not
impose term limits on Congressional
members, Thomas dissented." Thomas
argued that where the Constitution is
textually silent on an issue, it does not bar
action by the States or the people, since all
power comes from the States unless it is
expressly given to the Federal
Government." Thomas wrote:
As far as the Federal Constitution is
concerned, then, the States can exercise all
powers that the Constitution does not
withhold from them. The Federal
Government and the States thus face
different default rules: where the
Constitution is silent about the exercise of
a particular power that is, where the
Constitution does not speak either
10 See icL at 131 (arguing that federal courts should
first examine their role before infringing on state
powers).
11 See infra notes 14, 19, 21, 45, 51 and 55
(discussing Thomas's concurring or dissenting
opinions in United States Term Limits V.
Thornton, Missouri v. Jenkins, Hudson v.
McMillian, Stenberg v. Carhart, United States v.
Lopez, United States v. Morrison, and Printz v.
United States).
12 514 U.S. 779 (1995)
13 See id. at 837-38 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding
that allowing states to adopt term limits for
Members of Congress would "erode the structure
envisioned by the Framers.").
14 See id. at 845-46 (noting that the majority
"fundamentally misunderstands the notion of
"reserved' powers").
expressly or by necessary implication the
Federal Government lacks that power and
the States enjoy it.' 5
In Missouri v. Jenkins," Thomas, in a
concurring opinion, criticized Federal
courts for overreaching in their use of
equitable powers to remedy
desegregation." He cited The Federalist
Papers and the nation's early history for
his reasoning." He also defended the
Constitutional prerogatives of the States
by arguing that local government is the
best way to defeat institutionalized
desegregation:
Federal courts do not possess the
capabilities of state and local governments
in addressing difficult educational
problems. State and local school officials
not only bear the responsibility for
educational decisions, they also are better
equipped than a single federal judge to
make the day-to-day policy, curricular, and
funding choices necessary to bring a
school district into compliance with the
Constitution."
Sometimes, Justice Thomas rises to the
defense of the States in strange contexts,
where one might not expect this to be the
principal argument. He raised the state
authority argument in his dissent from the
Court's decision in Hudson v. McMillian2 0
that certain beatings of prison inmates
amounted to a violation of the Eighth
Amendment's "cruel and unusual
punishment" clause.2  Thomas argued
that the "Eighth Amendment is not, and
15 Id. at 847-48.
16 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
17 See i. at 114.
18 See i. at 129-31 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing that federal powers were never meant to
infringe upon state sovereignty).
19 Id. at 131-32.
20 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
21 Id. at 9-11.
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should not be turned into, a National
Code of Prison Regulation," and
maintained that the Court failed "to
recognize that primary responsibility for
preventing and punishing such conduct
rests not with the Federal Constitution,
but with the laws and regulations of the
various States."22
B.
As the aforementioned examples illustrate,
there is little evidence that Justice Thomas
is concerned about the jurisprudence of
the last fifty years, which has elevated the
importance of humanity and individual
dignity as constitutional values. His
concern for the prerogatives of the States
often leaves little room to be solicitous of
the rights of individuals.
One example of Thomas' concern for the
prerogatives of the States is his dissenting
opinion in the "partial-birth" abortion
case, Stenberg v. Carhart.' In his dissent,
Thomas went into graphic and gruesome
detail, describing so-called "partial-birth"
abortion procedures with the effect, and
perhaps intent, to shock the reader.2 4 His
opinion reflects concern for the fetus,25
for possible health risks to the woman
having the abortion,26 and for the States. 27
22 Id at 28 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Federal government does not have the
authority to set standards for the beatings of
prison inmates).
23 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (holding a Nebraska statute
banning partial birth abortions unconstitutional
because it failed to consider the mother's
individual health).
24 Id. at 984-89 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (providing
graphic details of three different late-term abortion
procedures).
25 See id. at 983-90 (describing the harm to the
fetus).
26 See id. at 1015-18 (discussing the detrimental
effects to a woman's health)
27 See id at 1006-08 (noting possible problems for
the States).
Nowhere in his discussion did Thomas
pay attention to the impact of an
unwanted pregnancy on the mother, who
might not be able to get the late-term
abortion. He described abortion simply as
a matter to be regulated by the States and
argued that courts should not be second-
guessing the value judgments of state
legislatures.28 He wrote, "the question
whether States have a legitimate interest in
banning the procedure does not require
additional authority. In a civilized society,
the answer is too obvious, and the
contrary arguments too offensive, to ment
further discussion. 2 9
The dissenting opinion in Stenberg was
the first time Thomas expressed his own
views on abortion.30 However, in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey," he joined the
partial dissenting opinions of Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist3 2 and Justice
Antonin Scalia." The stridency of
Thomas' rejection of a constitutional right
to- abortion should not be overlooked,
recalling that he told the Senate Judiciary
Committee during his confirmation
hearing in 1991, that "I did not and do not
28 Id. at 1007.
29 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 1007-08.
30 See id at 983 (describing "partial-birth"
abortions as "gruesome," "traumatic," and
"border(ing) infanticide"); see also Nomination of
Judge Clarence Thomas, supra note 2, at Part I,
222-23 (responding to questions noting that
Thomas has never debated the issues and merits of
Roe v. Wade).
31 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
32 Id at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that Roe was decided wrongly according to stare
decisis).
33 Id. at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
although the States are constitutionally allowed to
permit abortions whenever a citizen so chooses,
each state is not constitutionally required to
provide such abortions to its citizens).
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have a position on the outcome"" of Roe
v. Wade," the original decision
recognizing a right to abortion. In his
dissenting opinion in Stenberg, Thomas
made clear what he really thought of the
abortion right:
Nothing in our Federal Constitution
deprives the people of this country of the
right to determine whether the
consequences of abortion to the fetus and
to society outweigh the burden of an
unwanted pregnancy on the mother.
Although a State may permit abortion,
nothing in the Constitution dictates that a
State must do so. 3 6
In cases where there is a claim of
individual rights, a plea for the
Constitution to recognize the individual
dignity of all, Thomas' view of the
Constitution is just plain stingy.
Consistently, his passion is on the side of
Federalism,3 and any sign of compassion,
as a prism through which to read and
interpret the Constitution, is lacking."
34 Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas, supra
note 2, at Part I, 223 (answering questions about
his actions indicating disagreement with the
Court's ruling in Roe including contributing
articles, columns, and workgroups). See also Anton
Bell, Clarence Thomas: Evasive or Deceptive, 21
N.C. Cent. L.J. 194, 207 (1995) (commenting that
Thomas refused to give a definitive answer on
abortion).
35410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 980 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
3 See Laura A- Till, Justice Clarence Thomas: The
Emerging "New Federalist" on the Rehnquist
Court, 12 Regent U. L. Rev. 585, 588-89 (1999-
2000) (asserting that Justice Thomas is the most
ardent supporter of Federalism on the Supreme
Court).
38 See Catharine Pierce Wells, Clarence Thomas:
The Invisible Man, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 117, 146
(1993) (describing Justice Thomas as a man who
does not open his heart to individual cases of
wrongdoing).
C
There is another hallmark of Thomas'
tenure on the Supreme Court. He is
engaging in his own brand of judicial
activism. 9  Thomas is gradually building
up, in concurring and dissenting opinions,
an impressive array of invitations to
litigants to bring cases to the Supreme
Court and raise specific Constitutional
issues he would like an opportuity to
decide. Typically, these invitations raise
issues that would allow Thomas to
advance his belief in Federalism and the
power of the States.40
Thomas hardly promotes the image of a
classic conservative justice who sticks to
the issues raised in the cases before him
and does not go roaming over the
landscape of the Constitution. Of course,
Thomas is not the first justice to give in to
the temptation of wanderlust.4 However,
it is somewhat surprising to see Thomas
profess a form of constitutional restraint,
through Federalism limitations on the
power of Congress and the courts, and
meanwhile, reach out beyond the issues
presented to the Supreme Court for
opportunities to advance his views of the
Constitution.4 2
39 See Thomas L. Jipping, Judge Thomas is the
First Choice: The Case for Clarence Thomas, 12
Regent U. L. Rev. 397, 470 (1999-2000) (discussing
Thomas' use of judicial restraint as a form of
judicial activism).
40 See Till, supra note 37, at 588-90 (explaining that
Thomas' opinions advocate returning power to the
States).
41 See generally Earl i Maltz, The Prospects for a
Rival of Conservative Activism in Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 629, 648-68 (1990)
(discussing conservative judicial activism in the
area of affirmative action programs).
42 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that in
a future case the Supreme Court should temper its
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a way that is
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The Commerce Clause is a favorite target
for these Thomas excursions. In the Gun-
Free Schools Zone Act case, United States
v. Lopez,43 where the Court struck down a
Federal law penalizing possession of a
handgun within one thousand feet of a
school, Thomas wrote the lone concurring
opinion." He put the Court and future
litigants on notice that he is ready, given
the right case, to reconsider the
"substantial effects" test under the
Commerce Clause4 5  because it is
inconsistent with the original intent of the
Framers.
Similarly, in the Violence Against Women
Act case, United States v. Morrison, 7
Thomas concurred briefly, stating that he
had no quarrel with the decision
invalidating the part of the federal statute
that gave victims of gender-motivated
violence the right to sue for damages.48
This, Thomas noted, was a correct
application of existing precedent."
However, Thomas again invited litigants
to bring forth actions to abandon the
''substantial effects" test and return to the
Framers' original intent when dealing with
the Commerce Clause." If he could find
more faithful to the original understanding of the
Commerce Clause).
43 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
44 Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(distinguishing his view from the majority opinion
by noting that Commerce Clause jurisprudence
must return to the original intent of the Framers).
45 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law
190-91 (1997) (discussing the application of the
"substantial effects" test to the Commerce Clause).
46 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (calling for a "re-
examination" of the application of the Commerce
Clause in Supreme Court jurisprudence).
47 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
48 Id. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring).
49d (consenting with the majority's application of
Lopez).
50 See id. (stating that until the Court replaces its
existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
Congress will be appropriating state police powers
under the guise of regulating commerce), see
the right case and muster a majority,
Thomas would return Commerce Clause
jurisprudence to the days before the Great
Depression, ignoring the Cour's opinions
over the last sixty-plus years.
Traditional notions of Federalism are not
the only fare promised in Thomas'
invitations. In the "Brady Act" (Handgun
Violence Protection Act) case, Printz v.
United States,5 Thomas accepted the
Court's decision to strike down the
obligation of local law enforcement
officials to conduct background checks on
handgun purchases, based on
Federalism.52 In his brief concurring
opinion, however, he expressed the hope
that the Court will have a chance to
discourse on the meaning of the Second
Amendment" as a separate and untapped
source of limitation on the power of
Congress. 54 Thomas even used the
occasion to join in the contemporary
debate among legal historians and
constitutional theorists over the meaning
of the Second Amendment.
Thomas has outlined an ambitious agenda
for himself and the Court. It is a strange
trademark for a Justice who consistently
tells audiences that an important limitation
generally Christopher E. Smith & Joyce A. Baugh,
The Real Clarence Thomas 186-88 (2000) (noting
that Thomas is the sole justice to reject the
"substantial effects" test).
51 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
52 Id. at 936-37 (Tomas, J., concurring) (noting
specifically the limited powers of the Federal
government).
5 U.S. Const. amend. II (stating "A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.").
54 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 938-39 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (welcoming a discussion on the
breadth of the Second Amendment limiting
Congressional action on the matter).
5 See id. at 938 n.2 (citing numerous authors and
sources that have analyzed and critiqued the
application of the Second Amendment).
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on the power of the Supreme Court is that
it cannot reach out to decide issues not
properly presented before the Court."
III.
There are more curious aspects of Justice
Thomas' tenure that stand out. It has long
occupied the attention of lawyers and
journalists watching the Supreme Court
that Thomas almost never asks questions
during oral argument, even though he sits
among colleagues who are very active
questioners.57  This is not, in itself,
remarkable. Justice Brennan rarely asked
questions in his later years on the bench,
and he was never criticized or ridiculed
for it. 58
What is curious is that after saying little
about the matter for years, Thomas gave a
rather strange explanation to a group of
high school students in December 2000.51
He explained that when he was growing
up, he spoke a dialect called "Geechee," or
"Gullah," which comes from the area of
southeast Georgia where he was born.'
He said he developed the habit of
listening in school, rather than asking
56 See Address by Justice Clarence Thomas,
Fifteenth Annual Ashbrook Memorial Dinner 4,
11 (Feb. 5, 1999) (commenting on Article III
restraints on his power as a Justice), available at
http://www.ashbrookorg/events/memdin/thom
as/speech.html.
5 See generally Ken Foskett, Thomas Building
Conservative Judicial Legacy, Palm Beach Post,
July 6, 2001, at 1A (remarking that Thomas is the
only one of the nine justices that does not ask
questions from the bench); David G. Savage, Say
the Right Thing, 83 A.B.A. J. 54, 55-56 (1997)
(asserting that Thomas' silence prompts a good
amount of speculation, especially in comparison to
his engaged colleagues); Calvin Trillin, Doubting
Thomas, Time, Jan. 8, 2001, at 16 (questioning
whether Thomas' silence is an admirable value).
5 Savage, supra note 57, at 55.
5 See Thomas Explains Silence, Fla. Times-Union,
Dec. 14, 2000, at A8.
60 Id.
questions, because he had a hard time
mixing standard English with the dialect.'
Though this is a moving story, it is an odd
explanation for a person who has been in
public life almost continuously since 1974,
including: giving many public speeches,
some broadcast live on GSPAN;
testifying on live television and radio for
days before the Senate Judiciary
Committee; presiding over public
meetings of government agencies; and
engaging in a variety of public speaking
opportunities.6 2 Indeed, it is hard to
imagine a more commanding voice than
the deep baritone of Thomas. Perhaps it
would have been better to leave his
reasoning a mystery, rather than to explain
it.
The speeches delivered by Thomas can
also be curious at times, especially when
they fail to acknowledge that they
contradict each other. In February 1998,
he spoke at a meeting of the American
Inns of Court in Houston, Texas, and
allowed the South Texas Law Review to
publish a copy of his remarks, titled
Civility." The speech addressed the
problems caused by the decline of civility
in public discourse in American life, and
particularly how the loss of civility makes
self-governance more difficult." This is
certainly a much-discussed topic and one
that seems a safe ground for a Supreme
Court Justice seeking to avoid speaking on
contemporary political or legal
controversies.
61Id.L
62 See generally Clarence Thomas Biographical
Data, available at
http://supct.aw.cornell.edu/supct/justices/thoma
s.bio.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2001).
63 See Clarence Thomas, Civility, 39 S. Tex. L. Rev.
655 (1998) (critiquing America for its modern day
lack of civility).
64 Id. at 658-59.
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Remarkably, however, in February 2001,
Thomas delivered the important Francis
Boyer lecture at the American Enterprise
Institute in Washington, D.C.,65 decrying
the failure of many people to stand up for
important principles and defend their
beliefs. Without any reference to the
earlier speech, he blamed this failure on
"an overemphasis on civility" and claimed
that "the insistence on civility in the form
of our debates has the perverse effect of
cannibalizing our principles, the very
essence of a civil society." 6 To be sure, in
the Boyer Lecture, he was warning that
too much civility can lead to political
correctness and excessive self-censorship,
which are not virtues Thomas values.' It
is bizarre that Thomas gave the second
speech without some acknowledgment
that it takes a somewhat different tack
than the first, or at least that it seeks to
build on views he has already expressed.
IV.
Justice Clarence Thomas reached the
milestone of ten years on the Supreme
Court at a comparatively young age. Born
on July 28, 1948, he passed the ten year
mark at only fifty-three years old. 8 He is
likely to have a long, record-breaking
tenure on the Court. There will be many
more opportunities to assess his
performance in the years ahead and to
look back at the durability of these
preliminary observations.
Copyright © 2002 American University
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the
Law
65 See Clarence Thomas, Francis Boyer Lecture,
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research (Feb. 13, 2001) (speaking on his
observations in his role as a citizen of the United
States), available at
http://www.aei.org/boyer/thomas/htm.
66 L. at 5.
67 Id. at 6.
68 See Smith & Baugh, supra note 50, at 15-18
(describing Clarence Thomas' background).
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